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CURIOUSER AND CURIOUSER:
INVOLUNTARY MEDICATIONS AND INCOMPETENT
CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS AFTER SELL V. UNITED STATES

Dora W. Klein*

INTRODUCTION

In constitutional law, the gold standard of individual liberties is the specific
pronouncements found in the Bill of Rights,' the first ten amendments adopted to
protect against abuses of power by government officials.2 While all of us benefit
from the balance of power that these protections ensure, many of the amendments'
limits on governmental overreaching are particularly important to those of us the
government suspects of committing a crime. The Fifth Amendment, for example,

provides for indictment by a grand jury, and prohibits the government from holding
* Law Clerk to Judge Deborah L. Cook, United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit; J.D., Vanderbilt University Law School; M.A. (Psychology), University of
Pennsylvania; B.A., Swarthmore College. For helpful comments, inspiration, and general
good will, the author thanks Patricia Farren, Nancy King, Thomas McCoy, and Priya
Travassos.
For example, courts are especially careful to protect enumerated rights from unjustified
government infringement. See, e.g., W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,638
(1943) ("Much of the vagueness of the due process clause disappears when the specific prohibitions of the First [Amendment] become its standard .... [F]reedoms of speech and of

press, of assembly, and of worship... are susceptible of restriction only to prevent grave and
immediate danger to interests which the state may lawfully protect."); see also United States
v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (proposing a "narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within
a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments"). Also,
courts generally presume that the rights listed in the first eight amendments apply to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment. See Michael Doff, Equal ProtectionIncorporation,88

VA. L. REv. 951, 971 (2002) ("Enumeration in the Bill of Rights creates a rebuttable
presumption that a right applies against the states, and lack of enumeration creates a
rebuttable presumption against recognizing a proposed right against state or federal action.").
2 See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 372 (1910) (noting that the "predominant
political impulse" of proponents of the Bill of Rights "was distrust of power, and they
insisted on constitutional limitations against its abuse"); Barron v. Mayor of Balt., 32 U.S.
(7 Pet.) 243,249 (1833) ("In almost every convention by which the constitution was adopted,
amendments to guard against the abuse of power were recommended."); see also Louis
Kaplow & Steven Shavell, FairnessVersus Welfare, 114 HARv. L. REv. 961, 1220 n.633
(2001) ("The procedural protections in the Bill of Rights are grounded in significant part in
concerns about abuse of power.").
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a person in jeopardy twice for the same offense, from compelling a defendant to
testify against himself, and from depriving anyone of life, liberty, or property
without due process.3 The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant a
lengthy list of trial rights, from the right to a speedy trial to the right to assistance
of counsel.4 And the Eighth Amendment prohibits excessive bail, along with cruel
and unusual punishments.5
In addition to these specific rights, the Supreme Court has read the Sixth
Amendment to include a right to be present to defend against the government's
charges. 6 This right means not only that the defendant must be given the opportunity to be physically present, but also that he must possess the mental ability both
to understand the charges against him and to consult with his lawyer in preparing
8
a defense.7 A defendant who lacks this mental ability is incompetent to stand trial.
Some defendants are incompetent to stand trial because of disorders that are
essentially untreatable, such as mental retardation; these defendants are unlikely ever
to become competent. Other defendants, who are incompetent because of a treatable
mental illness such as schizophrenia, might become competent if they receive
amend. V.
4 The Sixth Amendment provides that:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have
been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against
him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor,
and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.
3 U.S. CONST.

U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
5 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.

See Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1934).
7 The Due Process Clause prohibits the conviction of a defendant who is incompetent
to stand trial. See Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378 (1966) ("The State concedes that the
conviction of an accused person while he is legally incompetent violates due process, and
that state procedures must be adequate to protect this right." (citing Bishop v. United States,
350 U.S. 961 (1956))). The test for competence to stand trial is whether a defendant "has
sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational
understanding - and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the
proceedings against him." Dusky v.United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960).
8 The lawrecognizes variouskinds ofcompetence, fromcompetence to consentto medical
treatment, to competence to make a will. As used in this Article, the term "competence" only
refers to competence to stand trial, unless otherwise indicated. See supra note 7 (discussing
test for competence to stand trial). An additional note on terminology: this Article refers to
the government's interest in renderinga defendant competent to stand trial. Some cases refer
to the interest as one of "restoring" competence, suggesting, perhaps erroneously, that the
defendant has been competent at some time in the past. See, e.g., United States v. Weston,
255 F.3d 873, 879 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (referring to "the governmental interest in restoring a
pretrial detainee's competence to stand trial"), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1067 (2001).
6
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treatment - usually antipsychotic or other psychotropic medications that can potentially alleviate, although not cure, the symptoms of schizophrenia and other
psychotic disorders.' But a defendant who, because of his mental illness, believes
that his doctors, or the FBI, or the special beings that communicate with him
through his radio, are trying to poison him, or are taking thoughts out of his head,
or are otherwise out to get him, can be difficult to convince that taking psychotropic
medications is in his best medical interest.'I If a defendant refuses to take these
medications, the government is left to decide whether to seek a court order allowing
for the administration of the medications over the defendant's objections."
Several difficult issues arise, however, when the government requests such an
order. The first issue, common to all cases in which the government seeks to administer involuntary medications, is that administering the medications must serve a
government interest - such as preventing a mentally ill person from harming
himself or others - that justifies abridging the person's interest in refusing unwanted medical treatments.' 2 An additional issue, unique to cases in which the
government seeks to administer involuntary medications to a criminal defendant for
the purpose of rendering him competent to stand trial, is that the medications will
threaten many of the defendant's trial rights. Any medication that succeeds in
rendering the defendant competent to stand trial is likely to alter his mental
functioning and physical appearance in myriad ways, thereby potentially compromising the fairness of his trial.1 3 For example, a medicated defendant can have
9 See infra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
'0

As one leading abnormal psychology text explains:

A major problem with any kind of treatment for schizophrenia is
that many patients with schizophrenia lack insight into their impaired
condition and refuse any treatment at all. As they don't believe they
have an illness, they don't see the need for professional intervention,
particularly when it includes hospitalization or drugs. This is especially

true of those with paranoid schizophrenia, who may regard any therapy
as a threatening intrusion from hostile outside forces.
GERALD C. DAVISON & JOHN M. NEALE, ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY 304 (8th ed. 2003)

(citation omitted).
" See infra note 92 and accompanying text.
12See infra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
" See Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 138 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
("[I]nvoluntary medication with antipsychotic drugs poses a serious threat to a defendant's
right to a fair trial."); United States v. Gomes, 289 F.3d 71, 80 (2d Cir. 2002) ("[A]ntipsychotic drugs can affect a defendant's in-court demeanor as well as his willingness and
ability to assist in his defense, thereby implicating Sixth Amendment rights to a fair trial."),
vacated by 539 U.S. 939 (2003); United States v. Weston, 206 F.3d 9, 14 (D.C. Cir. 2000)
(per curiam) ("Involuntary antipsychotic medication has the potential to adversely affect the
defendant's ability to obtain a fair trial as guaranteed under the Sixth Amendment.").
If successful in rendering a previously incompetent defendant competent to stand trial,
medications have necessarily altered the defendant's mental functioning in some ways. It is
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difficulty concentrating, 4 and thus he might have problems consulting with his
attorney or testifying on his own behalf. Medications can also unfairly prejudice a
jury's perception of a defendant's character or credibility. A jury might decide that
a defendant who looks drowsy or disinterested15 is coldhearted or that a defendant
who is experiencing motor tremors 16 is nervous or not telling the truth.
implausible to believe that such medications would alter only those particular mental
processes that enable a defendant to understand the nature of the charges against him and to
assist his attorney in preparing a defense, see supra note 7 (discussing criteria for competence
to stand trial), leaving every other aspect of the defendant's mental functioning unaltered.
Some courts have suggested that these additional changes will increase, at least in some
ways, the fairness of a defendant's trial. See, e.g., Weston, 255 F.3d at 883 (asserting that
medications will "enhance some of Weston's trial rights"). Even if this is true, though, a
government action that enhances a trial's fairness in one way does not thereby make up for
diminishing the trial's fairness in other ways. The government must allow the defendant the
opportunity to exercise all the rights guaranteed under the Constitution.
14 See ROBERT M. JULIEN, A PRIMER OF DRUG AcTION 508 (9th ed. 2001) (stating that
antipsychotic medications such as Haldol, as well as all of the phenothiazines, "produce[]
sedation and an indifference to external stimuli and reduce[] initiative, anxiety, and
activity"). These traditional antipsychotic medications also can exacerbate the cognitive
impairments associated with some psychotic disorders. See id. at 507 (citing research
indicating that antipsychotic medications generally do not improve the cognitive functioning
of people with schizophrenia, and that "[p]henothiazines with anticholinergic and/or sedative
side effects may even have additional detriments"). Even the newer antipsychotics cause
sedation. See id. at 514 ("Sedation occurs in about 40 percent of patients taking clozapine;
it may be dose-limiting and have a negative impact on compliance.") (emphasis omitted); id.
at 517 (noting that "[c]ommon side effects of risperidone include somnolence"); id. at 520
(stating that "[t]he major side effects induced by olanzapine" include "sedation"). The
atypicals also cause other side effects that can interfere with the ability to concentrate. See
id. at 514 (stating that clozapine can cause "hypotension" and "excessive drooling"); id. at
517 (explaining that agitation and anxiety are common side effects of risperidone); id. at 520
(noting that olanzapine's major side effects include dizziness).
'5 See supra note 14 (indicating that antipsychotic medications can cause side effects that
include sedation).
Courts might try to minimize the risk that medication effects will deprive a defendant
of a fair trial by informing the jury about the medication or allowing experts to testify about
the medication. See, e.g., Weston, 206 F.3d at 15 (Henderson, J., concurring) ("[T]he
testimony of both lay and expert witnesses, whether on direct or cross, will suffice to address
any differences in Weston's appearance."). If a jury convicts a defendant to whom the
government is administering involuntary medications, however, there is no way to determine
whether the jury found the defendant guilty because of the evidence against him or because
the government, by administering the medications, prevented the defendant from being able
to focus on his attorney's advice, to express his thoughts to the jury, or even to sit still or stay
awake during the trial. Cf. Riggins, 504 U.S. at 137 ("Efforts to prove or disprove actual
prejudice from the record before us would be futile, and guesses whether the outcome of the
trial might have been different if Riggins' motion [to discontinue antipsychotic medications]
had been granted would be purely speculative.").
16 Motor disturbances are the most significant side effects produced by the traditional
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Given the importance of the right to a fair trial, and the threat to this right poseu
by administering involuntary medications, the Supreme Court understandably
cautions in its recent decision in the case of Sell v. United States 7 that the instances
in which the government will be justified in administering such medications for the
purpose of rendering a defendant competent to stand trial "may be rare.' 8 Under
the test the Court sets forth in Sell, however, what instead might be rare are
instances in which a court decides that involuntary medications are not justified.
In discussing why the Sell test likely will result in the administration of
involuntary medications to incompetent defendants in more than rare instances, this
Article considers both what the Court's opinion in Sell says and what it fails to say.
One thing the Sell opinion does address is the factors that courts must consider when
deciding whether the government may administer involuntary medications to render
a defendant competent to stand trial.' Under the Sell test, the government may
administer involuntary medication that is (1) "medically appropriate," (2) "substantially unlikely to have side effects that may undermine the fairness of the trial," (3)
decided upon after "taking account of less intrusive alternatives," and (4) "necessary
significantly to further important governmental trial-related interests. "20
As discussed in Part I, this test favors allowing the government to administer
involuntary medications, at the expense of protecting the defendant's trial rights,
because in many, if not almost all, cases it is likely that the government will easily
meet the first three criteria of the Sell test. The first criterion requires only that

antipsychotic medications:
Neuroleptic drugs produce two main kinds of motor disturbances,
which comprise both the most bothersome and the most serious side
effects associated with the use of these agents. The two syndromes are
(1) acute extrapyramidal reactions, which develop early in treatment in
up to 90 percent of patients, and (2) tardive (late) dyskinesia, which
occurs much later, during and even after cessation of chronic neuroleptic therapy.
JULIEN, supra note 14, at 504. Although newer drugs are less likely to produce motor
disturbances, this advantage of atypical antipsychotics appears to exist only at lower doses,
and perhaps only for patients who have previously taken traditional antipsychotics:
Extrapyramidal symptoms are minimal at doses below 8 mg/day and
increase with doses above 8 mg/day. However, in newly diagnosed
patients with schizophrenia with no previous exposure to antipsychotic drugs, extrapyramidal symptoms were identical to those produced
by haloperidol, even at low doses of risperidol (mean daily dose was
3.2 mg).
Id. at 517-18.
17
18

'9

539 U.S. 166 (2003).

Id. at 180.
Id. at 179.

20 Id.
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treatment be medically appropriate, an in general, antipsychotic medications are
medically appropriate for the treatment of serious psychotic disorders.2' Also,
because these medications are usually the only type of treatment capable of
alleviating the symptoms of such disorders and possibly rendering a defendant
competent to stand trial,22 courts are likely to find that no less intrusive alternatives
exist, satisfying the third criterion. Moreover, although all antipsychotic medications are likely to cause some side effects, no way presently exists for predicting the
particular side effects a defendant will experience if administered a particular
medication.23 As a result, most courts will lack a sufficient basis for finding that, if
administered involuntary medications, a defendant will likely experience side effects
that will undermine the fairness of his trial.24 Involuntary medications, therefore,
are likely, in at least some cases, to cause side effects that will undermine a trial's
fairness, but courts are unlikely in any given case to decide that the defendant will
experience such side effects - and also unlikely to rule against involuntary
medications because of the second criterion. The only real limiting factor in the Sell
test is the last criterion, which requires courts to decide whether the government's
interests are "important" - a concept that the Court in Sell leaves undefined and
that since Sell, lower courts have defined in a variety of ways.
The Court's opinion in Sell also instructs trial courts that, whenever possible,
they should decide whether to allow the government to administer involuntary
medications on the basis of the government's interest in preventing an incompetent
defendant from harming himself or others rather than on the basis of its interest in
rendering the defendant competent to stand trial.25 The criteria for determining
whether to allow the government to administer involuntary medications to diminish
the defendant's dangerousness, however, provide for no consideration of trial
rights.26 Yet a defendant who not only is incompetent to stand trial, but also is a
danger to himself or others, has the same interest in receiving a fair trial as does an
incompetent defendant who is not a danger to himself or others. Given that no
sufficiently important government interest justifies this disparate treatment with
respect to incompetent defendants' trial rights,27 the Court's instruction raises the
possibility that mentally ill defendants who are both incompetent and dangerous will

21

See DAVISON & NEALE, supra note 10, at 308 ("Antipsychotic drugs are an

indispensable part of treatment for schizophrenia and will undoubtedly continue to be an
important component.").
22 See infra notes 89-92 and accompanying text.
23 See infra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
24 See infra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
25 See infra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
26 See infra Part I.C. 1.
27 See infra Part I.C.2.
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suffer violations of not only their right to a fair trial but also their right to the equal
protection of the laws.
Part H1discusses what the Court's opinion in Sell does not say. First, the Court's
opinion does not acknowledge that the lower courts in Sell were far from alone in
their efforts to determine when the government may administer involuntary
medications to render a defendant competent to stand trial.28 Many other courts,
most notably the D.C. District Court and the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals in the
case of United States v. Weston, 29 have considered the same question and have
reached the same conclusion - to allow involuntary medications - as did the
lower courts in Sell.3" Also, disappointingly absent from the Court's Sell decision
is an opinion authored by Justice Kennedy, whose opinions in previous involuntary
medication cases have been especially discerning.3 '
I. CURIOUS: WHAT THE SELL OPINION DOES SAY

A. Supreme Court Precedents and the Facts of Sell
Charles Thomas Sell, a St. Louis dentist, faces multiple counts of falsifying
insurance claims. 3 2 The charges were filed in 1997, nearly six years before the
Supreme Court heard Sell's case.33 The government has been delayed in bringing
this case to trial because Sell, diagnosed with a delusional disorder that has rendered
him unable to understand the nature of the charges brought against him and unable
to assist his attorney in preparing a defense, has been ruled incompetent to stand
trial.34 The government believes that treating Sell with antipsychotic medications
might sufficiently alleviate the symptoms of his mental illness so that he would
become competent to stand trial.3" Sell believes that the insurance fraud charges
are part of a larger conspiracy against him and has refused to take any of the

See infra note 117 and accompanying text.
See United States v. Weston, 69 F. Supp. 2d 99 (D.D.C. 1999), rev'd,206 F.3d 9 (D.C.
Cir. 2000): United States v. Weston, 134 F. Supp. 2d 115 (D.D.C.), affd, 255 F.3d 873 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1067 (2001).
30 See infra notes 117-23 and accompanying text.
31 See infra notes 130-34 and accompanying text.
32 Sell, 539 U.S. at 170. Sell has been charged with additional offenses that were not the
subject of the appeal. See United States v. Sell, 282 F.3d 560, 568 n.8 (8th Cir. 2002)
("Although Sell is also charged with conspiring to murder an FBI officer and a witness, we
base our reasoning solely on the seriousness of the fraud charges.") vacated, 539 U.S. 166
(2003).
13 Sell, 539 U.S. at 170 (indicating that charges were filed in May 1997).
3 See id.
3 See id.
28
29
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medications the government wants him to take.36 The question presented to the
Court was whether the government could administer these medications to Sell

37
despite his desire not to take them.

When the government first sought to administer involuntary medications to Sell,
it argued that the medications were necessary not only to render Sell competent to
stand trial but also to prevent him from harming himself or others.38 It is wellestablished that an individual's interest in refusing medications 9 can be outweighed
by the government's interest in protecting the health and safety of the public and
also, although in more limited circumstances,40 by the government's interest in
protecting the health and safety of the individual himself." Thus, the government
could probably administer involuntary treatment to Sell if he were so seriously
mentally ill that he posed a danger to himself or others.42
Id.at 171 (quoting a medical report noting "'the persistence of Dr. Sell's belief that the
Courts, FBI and federal government in general are against him"'); see also Transcript of Oral
Argument at 11-12, Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003) (No. 02-5664):
Question: As I take it .... he thinks that's why he is being prosecuted,
is that it, that the FBI is behind this?
Mr. Short [Sell's attorney]: Justice Souter, that's absolutely true.
36

Id.

31 Sell, 539 U.S. at 171; see also Sell v. United States, 537 U.S. 999,
999-1000 (2002)
(granting certiorari).
3 Sell, 539 U.S. at 172-73.
9 See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221-22 (1990) ("We have no doubt that...
respondent possesses a significant liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted administration
of antipsychotic drugs under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.").

4 See infra note 42.

See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979). The Court wrote:
The state has a legitimate interest under its parenspatriaepowers
in providing care to its citizens who are unable because of emotional
disorders to care for themselves; the state also has authority under its
police power to protect the community from the dangerous tendencies
of some who are mentally ill.
Id. at 426.
42 If Sell were a danger to his own safety, but not to others' safety,
then the government
might be allowed to administer involuntary medications only if Sell were also incompetent
to make his own treatment decisions. See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261,
278 (1990) ("The principle that a competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty
interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment may be inferred from our prior decisions.").
But see Harper, 494 U.S. at 222. The Court allowed the government to administer
involuntary medications to a prison inmate even when he was competent to make his own
treatment decisions:
Respondent contends that the State, under the mandate of the Due
Process Clause, may not override his choice to refuse antipsychotic
drugs unless he has been found to be incompetent .... We disagree.
The extent of a prisoner's right under the Clause to avoid the unwanted
41
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A magistrate judge agreed with the government that medications were necessary
to prevent Sell from injuring himself or others.43 The district court disagreed with
the magistrate judge's finding," however, and by the time the case reached the
Supreme Court, the only government interest that might have justified administering
involuntary medications to Sell was the possibility that the medications would
render him competent to stand trial."
Prior to Sell, the Court had never directly addressed the question of what
governmental interests can justify overriding an incompetent criminal defendant's
interest in refusing medication; the closest the Court had come was to state, in the
1992 case of Riggins v. Nevada, that one prerequisite to administering involuntary
medications is that a court must find that the governmental interests at stake justify
the medications. 46 The Nevada trial court in Riggins had not required the government to offer any reason for its decision to administer involuntary medications to
Riggins before and during his trial for first-degree murder.47 A jury convicted
Riggins and sentenced him to death; the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed.48 The
U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Nevada Supreme Court's affirmance, establishing
that before allowing involuntary medications, a trial court must make some finding
regarding the government's interests. 49 As Justice Kennedy observed in a
concurring opinion, however, the Court's decision was vague about what such a
finding must include.5" Not surprisingly, after Riggins, lower courts reached an

administration of antipsychotic drugs must be defined in the context of
the inmate's confinement.
Id. Additionally, even if the government could administer medications to diminish Sell's
dangerousness, the question would - or at least should - still remain whether the government could both administer involuntary medications for the purpose of diminishing
dangerousness and also continue to prosecute Sell without violating Sell's right to a fair trial.
See infra Part I.C.
41 Sell, 539 U.S. at 173 (stating that the magistrate judge concluded that the government
had proven that "anti-psychotic medications are the only way to render the defendant not
dangerous and competent to stand trial").
Id. at 174.
41 Id. at 175.
46 Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 138 (1992) ("[T]he record contains no finding that
might support a conclusion that administration of antipsychotic medication was necessary
to accomplish an essential state policy ...").
47 Id. at 131 ("The District Court denied Riggins's motion to terminate medication with
a one-page order that gave no indication of the court's rationale.").
48 See id. at 132 (discussing procedural history).
41 Id. at 138.
concurring) ("The Court's opinion will require further
" See id. at 140 (Kennedy, J.,
proceedings on remand, but there seems to be little discussion about what is to be
considered.").
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array of contradictory conclusions about when the government may administer
involuntary medications to incompetent defendants. 5'
The Court's decision in Sell clarifies a few of the broad questions that Riggins
left unanswered. For example, after Riggins it was unclear whether rendering a
defendant competent to stand trial could ever justify administering involuntary
medications when the medications were not also justified by the defendant's
dangerousness to himself or others. 2 Sell makes clear that the answer is yes. But
the Supreme. Court could not determine whether the government's interest in
bringing Sell to trial justified administering involuntary medications to him because,
as in Riggins, the Court concluded that the trial court had erred in allowing for the
administration of involuntary medications without first making all of the necessary
findings.54
B. The Not-So-Limited "Limited" Sell Standard
The Supreme Court suggested that the standard it adopted in Sell will result in
the administration of involuntary medications to incompetent criminal defendants
"in limited circumstances."55 The particular questions that the Court indicated that
trial courts must ask, however, are essentially the same questions that these courts,
including the lower courts in Sell, have been asking, with most deciding to allow
"lCompare United States v. Brandon, 158 F.3d 947,960 (6th Cir. 1998) (concluding that
"the decision to medicate a non-dangerous pretrial detainee must survive strict scrutiny"),
with United States v. Weston, 255 F.3d 873, 880 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (requiring "heightened
scrutiny" rather than strict scrutiny). Recent decisions have overwhelmingly followed Weston
rather than Brandon.See, e.g., United States v. Gomes, 289 F.3d 71, 82 (2d Cir. 2002). The
court wrote:
In accord with Riggins, Sell, and Weston, we hold that heightened, but
not strict, scrutiny is the appropriate standard ....
Although we are not
unmindful of Brandon's concerns about the important interests of the
defendant, we cannot accept the proposition that involuntary medication should be limited to defendants who are prosecuted for only the
most heinous crimes.
Id. (citations omitted).
52 See United States v. Weston, 69 F. Supp. 2d 99, 111 (D.D.C. 1999) ("[T]he case law
does not clearly indicate whether the government can forcibly medicate a defendant solely
to render him competent to stand trial."), rev'd,206 F.3d 9 (D.C. Cir. 2000); cf.Riggins, 504
U.S. at 135 ("The question whether a competent criminal defendant may refuse antipsychotic
medication if cessation of medication would render him incompetent at trial is not before
us."). Notably, the trial court had not found Riggins incompetent to stand trial but
nonetheless refused Riggins's request to discontinue psychotropic medications during his
trial. Id. at 130-31.
51 Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 179 (2003).
' Id. at 185.
51Id. at 169.
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involuntary medications.16 After Sell, courts' discussions can be expected to be
more thorough; nothing in the Supreme Court's opinion, however, provides a basis
for believing that these courts' conclusions will be any different.
According to Sell, the first question a trial court must consider before allowing
the government to administer involuntary medications to an incompetent defendant
for the purpose of rendering the defendant competent to stand trial is whether the
medications are "medically appropriate." 57 The Court in Sell imported this requirement from the 1990 decision in Washington v. Harper, a case in which a prison
inmate argued that he was constitutionally entitled to ajudicial hearing to determine
whether the government could compel him to take psychotropic medications.5 8 In
the prison setting, antipsychotic medications are sometimes used as a "chemical
straightjacket 5 9 to sedate unruly inmates; this practice led the HarperCourt to adopt
the requirement that medications must be medically appropriate in order to ensure
that antipsychotics were administered only to treat psychotic symptoms and not to
manage behavior problems.'
But while administering antipsychotic medications to an unruly, mentally
retarded prison inmate, for example, might effectively diminish his unruliness,
administering antipsychotic medications to an incompetent, mentally retarded

56

The standard applied by the Eighth Circuit in Sell:

First, the government must present an essential state interest that
outweighs the individual's interest in remaining free from medication.
Second, the government must prove that there is no less intrusive way
of fulfilling its essential interest. Third, the government must prove by
clear and convincing evidence that the medication is medically appropriate. Medication is medically appropriate if: (1) it is likely to render
the patient competent; (2) the likelihood and gravity of side effects do
not overwhelm its benefits; and (3) it is in the best medical interests of
the patient.
United States v. Sell, 282 F.3d 560,567 (8th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted), vacated,539 U.S.
166 (2003).
" Id. A medication is medically appropriate if it is "in the best medical interests of the
patient" in light of his medical condition. Id.
58 Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 217 (1990).
9 See generally Douglas Mossman, Unbuckling the "Chemical Straightjacket": The
Legal Significance of Recent Advances in the PharmacologicalTreatment of Psychosis, 39
SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1033 (2002).
o Harper,494 U.S. at 244-45 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
("Use of psychotropic drugs, the State readily admits, serves to ease the institutional and
administrative burdens of maintaining prison security and provides a means of managing an
unruly prison population and preventing property damage."); id. at 226 (indicating that the
Court upheld the constitutionality of a state statute governing the administration of
involuntary medications to prison inmates in part because under the statute "[t]he drugs may
be administered for no purpose other than treatment").
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defendant will not be effective in rendering him competent. 6 When a defendant is
incompetent to stand trial, administering medically inappropriate medications will
not achieve anything the government wants - a sedated incompetent defendant can
no more be brought to trial than a non-sedated incompetent defendant. Thus, the
government seems unlikely to seek to administer medically inappropriate medications to an incompetent pretrial defendant.
Although it continues to be cited by almost every court that considers the
question of administering involuntary medications to incompetent defendants,62
Harperis factually not at all similar to these cases. Harper's "medically appro-

priate" requirement therefore is not very likely to limit the number of cases in which
a court approves the government's request to administer involuntary medications
for the purpose of rendering a defendant competent to stand trial.
The part of the Sell test most likely to cause courts to deny the government's
petition to administer involuntary medications is the requirement that "important
governmental interests [must be] at stake. '63 The Court stated that bringing to trial
a defendant accused of "serious" crimes is an important government interest.' The
Court did not, however, offer any details about how courts should distinguish
between serious and nonserious crimes. The Eighth Circuit panel that reviewed the
district court's decision to allow involuntary medications in Sell was divided over
this issue, with two judges deciding that the insurance fraud charges were
sufficiently serious and one judge arguing that they were not.65
Medical appropriateness is still a useful criteria to have, however, to protect against
potential abuse, such as the tactics suggested by Justice Kennedy during oral argument in
Sell: "Could you send your guy out there with a needle the day before the trial... so that he
behaves the way the government wants him to at trial?" OnlineNewsHour Update: Supreme
61

CourtHears Court-OrderedMedication Case, PublicBroadcastingService (Mar. 3, 2003)

(quoting Justice Kennedy's question to a government lawyer), at http://www.pbs.org/
newshour/updates/scotus_03-03-03.html [hereinafter PBS NewsHour Update].Additionally,
a particularantipsychotic might be medically inappropriate for a particular defendant. For
example, an atypical antipsychotic that tends to cause weight gain might be medically
inappropriate for a defendant who suffers from diabetes. See Brief of Amicus Curiae
American Psychiatric Association and American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law
Supporting Respondent at 18, Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003) (No. 02-5664)
[hereinafter APA Brief] (noting "a risk of weight gain and, from long-term use, a risk of
diabetes" associated with newer antipsychotics). It seems unlikely, though, that
antipsychotics as a whole would be medically inappropriate, so long as they were being
administered to treat a psychotic disorder.
62 See, e.g., Sell, 282 F.3d at 567; United States v. Gomes, 289 F.3d 71, 86 (2d Cir.
2002).
63

Sell, 539 U.S. at 180.

6 Id. ("The Government's interest in bringing to trial an individual accused of a serious
crime is important.").
65 Compare Sell, 282 F.3d at 568 ("[T]he sixty-two charges of fraud and the single charge
of money-laundering are serious."), with id. at 572 (Bye, J., dissenting) ("[T]he charges
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The Supreme Court did reject the position that only violent crimes can be
serious,66 stating that "[tihe Government's interest in bringing to trial an individual
accused of a serious crime is important ...whether the offense is a serious crime
against the person or a serious crime against property. '67 But the Court did not
decide whether the insurance fraud alleged in Sell is sufficiently serious to justify
involuntary medications. The Court also did not discuss any objective criteria, such
as potential minimum or maximum sentence, 68 that future courts - including the
Sell district court on remand - might look to in deciding whether a particular
alleged offense is "serious. 69 Certainly, every crime is in some measure a violation
of, in the words of the Court in Sell, "the basic human need for security. ' 70 Further,
the Court quoted with approval from Illinoisv. Allen that the "[p]ower to bring an
accused to trial is fundamental to a scheme of 'ordered liberty' and a prerequisite to
social justice and peace."' 7' This statement suggests that the power to bring any
72
defendant to trial is a fundamental governmental interest.
Left largely on their own, federal courts since Sell have used a myriad of
conflicting criteria to determine whether a particular offense is "serious." In United
against Dr. Sell are not sufficiently serious to forcibly inject him with antipsychotic drugs
on the chance it will make him competent to stand trial.").
6 Sell, 539 U.S. at 180; cf. Sell v. United States, 537 U.S. 999, 999-1000 (2002)
(granting certiorari on question whether "the Court of Appeals erred in rejecting petitioner's
argument that allowing the Government to administer antipsychotic medications against his
will solely to render him competent to stand trial for non-violent offenses would violate his
rights under the First, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments") (emphasis added).
67 Sell, 539 U.S. at 180.
68 Cf.Sell, 282 F.3d at 573 (Bye, J., dissenting). Judge Bye wrote:
An overly generous estimation of Dr. Sell's alleged illegal activity
would place the value of his fraud within the range of $400,000 to
$1,000,000. Applying this estimate, his base offense level would be
20 and (assuming he has no prior criminal history) his sentencing
range would be 33-41 months. This sentencing range demonstrates
the charges against him are not serious enough to justify forcible
medication.
Id. (citation omitted); United States v. Gomes, 289 F.3d 71, 86 (2d Cir. 2002) (indicating that
alleged possession of a gun by a felon is serious enough to justify involuntary medications,
because it is a felony offense and, under the facts of the case, would carry a statutory
minimum sentence of fifteen years).
69 Sell, 539 U.S. at 180 (discussing "serious" crimes). For a broader discussion of the
difficulties involved in judging the seriousness of various crimes, see generally Eugene
Volokh, Crime Severity and ConstitutionalLine-Drawing, 90 VA. L. REv. 1957 (2004).
70 Sell, 539 U.S. at 180.
71 Id. (quoting Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 347 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring)).
72 It is unlikely, perhaps, that the government would choose to expend the necessary
resources to obtain an order allowing involuntary medication when an incompetent defendant
has been charged with jaywalking, for example. But such pragmatic, contingent constraints
are a poor substitute for the enforcement of constitutional guarantees.
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States v. Evans, for example, the Western District of Virginia held that a serious
crime is one that carries a maximum sentence of more than six months imprisonment. 73 The Western District of Texas rejected this six-month standard in United
States v. Barajas-Torres,ruling that under Sell only crimes against persons or
property can be serious, and denying the government's request to administer involuntary medications to an incompetent defendant charged with illegal reentry into the
United States.74 Also in conflict are United States v. Gomes, in which the District
of Connecticut allowed involuntary medications because, in light of the potential
mandatory minimum sentence of fifteen years, possession of a firearm by a
convicted felon is a serious offense,75 and United States v. Dumeny, in which the
District of Maine denied involuntary medications because even though it "carries
significant potential penalties," possession of a firearm by a person previously
committed to a mental health institute is not a serious offense.76

Once a trial court decides that the government's interest is "important", 77 it must
78
then ask whether "involuntary medication will significantlyfurther"that interest.
This question - which concerns the likelihood that medications will render the
defendant competent to stand trial, balanced against the likelihood that the
medications will cause side effects that will compromise the fairness of the
defendant's trial7 9 -

is unlikely to limit the instances in which trial courts allow

involuntary medications. Given the current state of knowledge about the treatment
of mental illnesses, courts presently have no choice but to base their decisions on
generalized, rather than individualized, information about the likelihood that
involuntary medications will render defendants competent to stand trial or infringe
their right to a fair trial. For example, antipsychotic medications are effective in
alleviating at least some symptoms of the most common psychotic disorder,
schizophrenia, in eighty to ninety percent of cases." Additionally, a few variables,
such as late onset of the disorder and good premorbid functioning, are associated
with a better response to medications, but even these factors are far from perfect
predictors of how a defendant will respond to antipsychotic medications.8 For
" 293 F. Supp. 2d 668, 674 (W.D. Va. 2003).
74 2004 WL 1598914, at *2-4 (W.D. Tex. July 1, 2004).
7' 305 F. Supp. 2d 158, 164, aff'd, 387 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 2004).
76 295 F. Supp. 2d 131, 132 (2004).
71 Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 180 (2003).
78 Id.at 181.
79 Id.
8o

See JULIEN, supra note 14, at 588 ("A substantial proportion of schizophrenic

patients -

about 10 to 20 percent - fail to demonstrate substantial improvement when they

are treated with neuroleptics." (quoting S.R. Marder et al., Schizophrenia, 16 PSYCHIATRIC
CLINICS N. AM., 567, 588 (1993))).
8 See Godfrey D. Pearlson et al., A ChartReview Study ofLate-Onset and Early-Onset
Schizophrenia, 146 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1568, 1568-74 (1989).
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disorders less common than schizophrenia, reliable data regarding the effectiveness
of psychotropic medications are more difficult to obtain.82 In most cases, then,
unless a defendant has taken psychotropic medications in the past, a court will be
unable to do more than offer a best guess as to which - if any - medications will
render a defendant competent to stand trial.83
Statistical data can also indicate the general likelihood that antipsychotic
medications will produce various side effects, but again, absent a defendant's
previous experience with a particular medication, no method exists for making an
individualized prediction about the side effects that the defendant will experience.
For example, approximately twenty percent of people who take one of the newer,
atypical antipsychotic drugs will experience acute extrapyramidal side effects' such
as akathesia, "a syndrome of the subjective feeling of anxiety, accompanied by
restlessness, pacing, constant rocking back and forth, and other repetitive, purposeless actions,"85 or dystonia, "characterized by involuntary muscle spasms and
sustained abnormal, bizarre postures of the limbs, trunk, face and tongue. '8 6 In most
cases, though, a court will have no way to determine whether a defendant will be
part of the twenty percent of individuals who experience such effects or part of the
eighty percent who do not.
The impossibility of predicting how a particular defendant will respond to
antipsychotic medications has prompted several courts to adopt a "medicate now,
evaluate later" approach.87 The alternative, as the D.C. District Court recognized in
See APA Brief, supra note 61, at 19-20 ("[T]he evidence respecting treatment of
delusional disorder is less definitive than for schizophrenia and other more common
psychotic illnesses (which also are less resistant to collecting systematic data).").
83 See United States v. Weston, 134 F. Supp. 2d 115, 136 (D.D.C.) ("[T]he reaction to
medication is unique to each patient."), affd, 255 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 534
U.S. 1067 (2001).
" See Robert R. Conley & Raney Mahmoud, A Randomized Double-Blind Study of
Risperidoneand Olanzapinein the Treatment ofSchizophreniaorSchizoaffective Disorder,
82

158 Am.J. PSYCHIATRY 765 (2001) ("Similar proportions of the risperidone and olanzapine

groups reported extrapyramidal symptoms (24% and 20%, respectively).").
85 JULIEN, supra note 14, at 504.
86 Id. at 505.
87 See United States v. Sell, 282 F.3d 560, 572 (8th Cir. 2002) ("[W]e believe that the
effects of the medication on Sell's competency and demeanor may properly be considered
once the medication is administered."); United States v. Weston, 255 F.3d 873, 883 (D.C.
Cir. 2001) ("We agree with the district court that '[t]here is no reason to conclude, at this
time, that involuntary medication would preclude Weston from receiving a fair trial."'
(quoting Weston, 134 F. Supp. 2d at 137)) (alteration in original).
The problem with this wait-and-see approach is the difficulty a court would face in
determining whether the medication's side effects would cause a trial to be unfair, even when
the court has the benefit of observing the defendant and assessing the actual side effects.
How will a court determine whether the defendant's experience of moderate or even slight
akathesia, for example, will violate the right to a fair trial? How distracted must the defendant
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United States v. Weston, is never to allow involuntary medications for the purpose
of rendering a defendant competent to stand trial:
There are many uncertainties regarding the effects that
medication will have on [the defendant' s] demeanor and thought
processes because the reaction to medication is unique to each
patient. However, the Court rejects [the defendant's] attorneys'
contention that this uncertainty precludes the use of medication
in this context at this time. To interpret "clear and convincing"
evidence as the defense suggests would effectively preclude
involuntary medication in every case, since the government
could never establish that a given individual would respond in
a predictable manner, no matter how high the statistical
probabilities.88
Because of both the probability that antipsychotic medications will alleviate at
least some symptoms of a defendant's psychotic disorder, and the impossibility of
predicting either the type or the severity of the side effects the defendant will
experience, trial courts are likely to conclude that administering involuntary
medications is substantially likely to further the government's interest in bringing
a defendant to trial without causing side effects that will undermine the trial's
fairness.
A trial court must also decide whether involuntary medications are "necessary"
for achieving the government's interests.8 9 In discussing this requirement, the Court
be before a court determines that the defendant cannot communicate with counsel or confront
witnesses or testify in his own words? How can a court determine that even a minor motor
tremor will not have a determinative effect on the jury's assessment of the defendant's
character or credibility, and ultimately of his guilt or innocence? Of course, courts confront
somewhat similar questions in determining competence to stand trial. See supra note 7
(discussing the test for competence). But determining whether a defendant understands the
nature of the charges against him or is capable of assisting his attorney is very different from
predicting how a defendant's mental functioning and physical appearance will impact a
jury's verdict. Additionally, an assessment of the defendant's competence to stand trial does
not require a court to approve any government action, whereas the question raised by
involuntary medications is how much government-induced prejudice a court should allow.
Cf. United States v. Weston, 206 F.3d 9, 21-22 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (Tatel, J., concurring)
("Here the question is whether due process permits the government through involuntary
administration of psychotropic drugs to alter the defendant so that it becomes impossible for
him to appear before the jury as he was when he committed the crime.").
88

Weston, 134 F. Supp. 2d at 136.

Somewhat perplexing is the Sell Court's instruction to trial courts to consider not only
the intrusiveness of medications as compared to other kinds of treatments, but also the
intrusiveness of different methods of administering medications. Sell v. United States, 539
89
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in Sell considered the suggestion of the American Psychological Association that
some nondrug treatments might render a psychotic defendant competent to stand
trial. 90 Even the American Psychological Association acknowledged, however, that
"such [alternative behavioral and psychosocial] therapies are often not adequate by
themselves to treat acute psychotic disorders."91 Sell's own attorney conceded that

U.S. 166, 181 (2003). In formulating this least intrusive route of administration requirement,
the Court seems to have in mind that some ways of forcing a defendant to take involuntary
medications, such as issuing a court order (the preferred way of the Court in Sell), are less
unpleasant than some other ways, such as injecting the medications or administering them
through a nasal tube. See id. What the Court does not discuss, however, is why medication
that a defendant cooperatively takes, but only because of a court order, is constitutionally
preferable to the same medication that is injected or administered through a nasal tube. The
defendant's liberty interest in refusing medical treatment is equally compromised, regardless
of how involuntary medications are administered. And involuntary medications that a
defendant takes cooperatively are not any less likely to compromise the fairness of the
defendant's trial. Thus, whether a defendant cooperates in response to a court order does not
seem to change the constitutional equation:
[A]n improper court order with which the defendant complies is no less
an invasion of his rights than physically forcing compliance with such
an improper order ....[W]e see no basis, therefore, for distinguishing

between forced medication, whereby the defendant is restrained and
injected, and medication pursuant to a court order with which the
defendant complies.
State v. Garcia, 658 A.2d 947, 952 n.8 (Conn. 1995).
Additionally, the Court in Sell does not indicate how a trial court should balance
administering involuntary medications in the least intrusive way possible with other
concerns, such as effectiveness in alleviating psychotic symptoms or severity of side effects.
What if, as happens to be true, medications that can be injected are likely to cause more
serious side effects than medications that can be administered to an uncooperative defendant
only through a nasal tube? For example, several older, traditional antipsychotic medications,
which are most likely to cause the most severe extrapyramidal side effects, are available in
injectible forms, while almost all of the newer, atypical antipsychotics, which are less likely
to cause such side effects, are available only in forms that must be ingested. Given that the
Court in Sell does not address these details, it is unlikely that trial courts, in deciding that no
means less intrusive than antipsychotic medications exist for rendering an incompetent,
psychotic defendant competent to stand trial, will look further than the American
Psychological Association's statement that nondrug "therapies are often not adequate by
themselves to treat acute psychotic disorders," Brief of American Psychological Association
at 12, Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003) (No. 02-5664), or the American Psychiatric
Association's statement that "[g]iven the dearth of comparably effective alternatives to
antipsychotic medication, a defendant may remain incompetent to stand trial indefinitely,"
APA Brief, supra note 61, at 25.
90 Sell, 539 U.S. at 181.

9'Brief of Amicus Curiae American Psychological Association at 12, Sell v. United
States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003) (No. 02-5664).
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without the ability to administer psychotropic medications, the government's only
choices would be to hold Sell under a civil commitment statute or to release him.92
Given that antipsychotic medications are the standard treatment for psychotic
disorders, and that a defendant who does not receive antipsychotic medications
might well remain psychotic indefinitely, trial courts are unlikely to pause for very
long over the requirement that the medications must be "necessary" for achieving
the government's interest in bringing a defendant to trial. Similarly, courts are apt
to have little trouble with the related requirement that they consider less intrusive
alternatives,94 given that no alternatives - less intrusive or otherwise - are as
likely as antipsychotic medications to reduce psychotic symptoms and render a
defendant competent to stand trial.
In sum, the test outlined in Sell is unlikely to result in the administration of
involuntary medications to incompetent defendants in only rare instances. More
likely, it will continue to be rare that a trial court determines that administering
involuntary medications is not "medically appropriate.... substantially unlikely to
have side effects that may undermine the fairness of the trial, and, taking account of
less intrusive alternatives .... necessary significantly to further important governmental trial-related interests. 95
C. An Equal Protection Challenge Waiting to Happen
In addition to setting out the test that courts must apply before allowing the
government to administer involuntary medications for the purpose of rendering a
defendant competent to stand trial, the Sell decision instructs trial courts to first
consider whether involuntary medications may be justified on the basis of an
incompetent defendant's dangerousness to self or others." Only if involuntary
medications cannot be justified on the basis of a defendant's dangerousness should
a court consider whether involuntary medications are justified on the basis of the
defendant's incompetence to stand trial.97

See Transcript of Oral Argument at 23-25, Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003)
(No. 02-5664); see also Sell, 282 F.3d at 568 (noting that Sell's expert "did not suggest any
alternative means [to antipsychotic medications] of restoring competency").
13 Sell, 539 U.S. at 181.
9 Id. (indicating courts must consider less intrusive alternatives).
9' Id. at 179.
96 Id. at 183 ("[A] court, asked to approve forced administration of drugs for purposes of
rendering a defendant competent to stand trial, should ordinarily determine whether the
government seeks, or has first sought, permission for forced administration of drugs on these
other Harper-type [dangerousness] grounds.").
" Id. ("Ifa court authorizes medication on those alternative [dangerousness] grounds, the
need to consider authorization on trial competence grounds will likely disappear.").
92
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The Supreme Court explained that trial courts should first determine whemer
involuntary medications may be justified on the basis of dangerousness because "the
inquiry into whether medication is permissible, say, to render an individual
nondangerous is usually more 'objective and manageable' than the inquiry into
whether medication is permissible to render a defendant competent." 9 It is hard to
imagine, however, a more forthright invitation to violations of the constitutional
guarantee of "equal protection of the laws."99 Under this provision of Sell, the
criteria that courts must use to determine whether the government can administer
involuntary medications - with the accompanying possibility of compromised trial
rights - will vary depending upon whether an incompetent defendant is also a
danger to himself or others. But both an incompetent defendant who is dangerous
and an incompetent defendant who is not dangerous have exactly the same interest
in receiving a fair trial - or in the language of equal protection jurisprudence, they
are similarly situated with regard to the right to a fair trial. °" Further, no sufficiently
important government interest justifies treating incompetent defendants unequally
with respect to trial rights on the basis of dangerousness to self or others.

98 Id. at 182 (quoting Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 140 (1992) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring)). As Justice Kennedy explained, though, immediately following the sentence in
his concurrence observing that determining whether to allow involuntary medications for the
purpose of diminishing dangerousness is "objective and manageable," the question for the
Court is more difficult when the government seeks to administer involuntary medications for
the purpose of rendering a defendant competent to stand trial because the potential
consequences for the defendant are more serious: "It is ... medicating the person for the
purpose of bringing him to trial, that causes most serious concern." Riggins, 504 U.S. at
140-41 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy could not have meant that a court can
sidestep an issue merely because it is difficult, if the result will be the unequal protection of
defendants' right to a fair trial. Other courts have recognized that in deciding whether to
allow the government to administer involuntary medications to an incompetent defendant,
regardless of the purpose for administering the medications, a court must take into account
the pretrial status of the defendant:
To the extent that Weston is in custody by reason of his incompetency
to stand trial, the relevant issues are at least his dangerousness to
himself and others, and the government's ability to bring him to trial.
But until he is convicted, Weston's rights and the relevant issues must
be viewed through a somewhat different prism than those for a
convicted prisoner. Weston's custodial status does not entail the
relinquishment of all rights that a person facing trial possesses, and
Riggins' departure from Harpersignals as much. In other words, the
issue raised by Weston was not settled in Harper.
United States v. Weston, 206 F.3d 9, 17 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (Rogers, J., concurring).
99 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
100 See, e.g., Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (citing
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982)) (indicating that the Equal Protection Clause "is
essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike").
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1. Unequal Protection of Trial Rights
As the Court in Sell recognized, tests for determining whether to allow
involuntary medications for the purpose of diminishing a defendant's dangerousness
are substantially different from the test for determining whether to allow involuntary
medications for the purpose of rendering a defendant competent to stand trial.'0 '
And while the criteria for allowing involuntary medications on the basis of incompetence to stand trial might provide inadequate protection of an incompetent
defendant's trial rights, 0 2 the criteria for allowing involuntary medications on the
basis of dangerousness afford these rights no protection at all.
The specific statutory provisions governing the administration of involuntary
medications for the purpose of diminishing dangerousness vary from state to state,
although all states allow involuntary treatment when a person is, because of a mental
illness, an imminent threat to the physical safety of himself or someone else.' 3
Some states also allow involuntary treatment when a mentally ill person is "gravely
disabled," meaning that he is unable to meet his basic needs such as the need for
food or shelter, or has a long history of deteriorating when not taking medications.,',
But legislatures have developed these criteria with the goal of furthering the
government's interest in ensuring citizens' safety while also protecting the liberty
interest in refusing medical treatment of those who are potentially subject to civil
commitment - not while also protecting the trial rights of those who are potentially
subject to criminal prosecution. 105 The Court in Sell acknowledges as much in
explaining that the lower courts failed to consider adequately the potential of
involuntary medications to infringe Sell's right to a fair trial:
The failure to focus upon trial competence could well have
mattered. Whether a particular drug will tend to sedate a
o See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
o2 See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
"'s The Supreme Court stated in Addington v. Texas that "the initial inquiry in a civil
commitment proceeding" is "[w]hether the individual is mentally ill and dangerous to either
himself or others and is in need of confined therapy." 441 U.S. 418, 429 (1979).
104See, e.g., Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 215 n.3 (1990).
Under Washington law, a person is "gravely disabled," and may
therefore be administered involuntary treatment, if: as a result of a
mental disorder [the individual]: (a) [i]s in danger of serious physical
harm resulting from a failure to provide for his essential human needs
of health or safety, or (b) manifests severe deterioration in routine functioning evidenced by repeated and escalating loss of cognitive or
volitional control over his or her actions and is not receiving such care
as is essential for his or her health or safety.
Id. (second alteration in original).
105 Id.
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defendant, interfere with communication with counsel, prevent
rapid reaction to trial developments, or diminish the ability to
express emotions are matters important in determining the
permissibility of medication to restore competence, but not
necessarily relevant when dangerousness is primarily at issue.
We cannot tell whether the side effects of antipsychotic
medication were likely to undermine the fairness of a trial in
Sell's case.'O°
Does the Court mean that these trial rights would have been less important to
Sell if the government could have administered involuntary medications to him
because he was dangerous? This clearly cannot be the case: a defendant who is a
danger to himself or others is no less in need of a fair trial than is a defendant who
is not a danger to himself or others. Yet the exact same concerns about the right to
a fair trial are raised when medications are administered to a dangerous defendant
as when administered to a nondangerous defendant. If, for example, involuntary
medications cause a defendant to be unable to pay attention to what prosecution
witnesses are saying, the resulting infringement of the right of confrontation would
be no less of a Sixth Amendment violation simply because the medications were
administered for the purpose of diminishing the defendant's dangerousness rather
than for the purpose of rendering the defendant competent to stand trial. °7
2. Inadequate Justification
The Equal Protection Clause allows the government to treat similarly situated
people differently if such treatment is justified by an adequate governmental
0 8
Whether a governmental interest is adequate depends upon the nature of
interest."
the individual interest involved.' 9 Unequal treatment involving a non-fundamental
interest requires only "that the classification at issue bears some fair relationship to
a legitimate public purpose."11 Unequal treatment involving a fundamental interest,
however, requires a "classification [that] has been precisely tailored to serve a
The right to a fair trial is among the most
compelling governmental interest.' '.
fundamental of individual interests. 12 Yet the only governmental interest the Court
106Sell,

539 U.S. at 185-86 (citation omitted) (finding the lower court failed to consider
adequately the potential infringement of Sell's fair trial rights).
107 The Sixth Amendment guarantees the right of a defendant "to be confronted with the
witnesses against him." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
108 See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982).
109Id.
110 Id.
.. id.at 217.
112 See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) ("From the very beginning, our
state and national constitution and laws have laid great emphasis on procedural and
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in Sell identifies as possibly justifying the unequal protection of incompetent
defendants' trial rights is that the criteria for deciding whether to allow involuntary
medications for the purpose of diminishing a defendant's dangerousness are more
"objective and manageable" than the criteria for deciding whether to allow
involuntary medications for the purpose of rendering a defendant competent to stand
trial." 3 The interest in applying a less cumbersome standard can hardly be considered compelling, however, in light of how rarely the Court finds a government
interest to be compelling" 4 and in comparison with the particular interests that the
Court has found to be compelling." 5
Courts may indeed find it easier to decide whether to allow the government to
administer involuntary medications for the purpose of diminishing a defendant's
dangerousness than to decide whether to allow the government to administer
involuntary medications for the purpose of rendering a defendant competent to stand
trial." 6 But allowing courts to avoid, on the basis of a defendant's dangerousness,
the more difficult questions is contrary to the mandates of equal protection, given
that (1) any medications a court decides to allow will pose exactly the same threat
to the defendant's trial rights, regardless of why they are administered, and (2) the
government lacks any interest sufficiently important to justify the disparate
protection of trial rights on the basis of whether an incompetent defendant is a
danger to himself or others. Thus, the Court's directive that a trial court ought first
to determine whether a defendant may be administered involuntary medications on
diminishing dangerousness grounds before (and perhaps instead of) considering
whether he may be administered involuntary medications on rendering competent
to stand trial grounds creates a curious hole in the protection afforded the trial rights

substantive safeguards designed to assure fair trials before impartial tribunals in which every
defendant stands equal before the law."); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462 (1938) ("The
Sixth Amendment stands as a constant admonition that if the constitutional safeguards it
provides be lost, justice will not 'still be done."').
1'
See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
114See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court, 1988 Term - Foreword.The Vanishing
Constitution, 103 HARv. L. REv. 43, 73 (1989) ("If a fundamental right or a suspect class is
involved, the Court will exercise strict scrutiny, and the government rarely succeeds.").
"' See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (finding racial diversity to be a
compelling interest); Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) (finding
"a compelling interest in protecting the physical and psychological well-being of minors");
Hampton v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 102 F. Supp. 2d 358 (W.D. Ky. 2000) (finding
that a school district's voluntary maintenance of a desegregated school system was a
compelling state interest).
116 See supra note 98 and accompanying text (indicating that the question whether
to allow
the government to administer involuntary medications for the purpose of diminishing
dangerousness is more "objective and manageable" than the question whether to allow the
government to administer involuntary medications for the purpose of rendering a defendant
competent to stand trial).
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of mentally ill defendants who are both dangerous and incompetent to stand tnai,
as compared to those who are incompetent to stand trial but not dangerous.
II. AND CURIOUSER: WHAT THE COURT DOES NOT SAY IN SELL

Along with the several curious things the Court does say in its Sell decision are
several curiosities by omission. The first is that the Court did not consider - or at
least offers no evidence that it did consider - the recent experiences of the federal
courts in the District of Columbia as they decided whether to allow the government
to administer involuntary medications to Russell Weston, who like Sell, was found
incompetent to stand trial and has refused to take voluntarily the medications that
might render him competent." 7
In 1998, Weston entered the U.S. Capitol building and shot three police officers,
killing two of them.' 18 Three years later, the second appellate panel to review the
case affirmed the district court's second decision allowing the government to
compel Weston to take psychotropic medications for the purpose of rendering him
competent to stand trial."' Before deciding to deciding to allow the government to
administer involuntary medications, the Weston district court considered (and
reconsidered) every question that the Court has now stated in Sell should be
considered. For example, the Supreme Court in Sell found that the lower courts had
failed to consider sufficiently the "trial-related side effects and risks" posed by
involuntary medications. 120 The final district court opinion in Weston, though,
contains page after page on the issue of side effects and risks relating to trials, 12' yet
still comes to the same conclusion as the lower courts in Sell: that the court could
not predict whether antipsychotic medications would cause side effects that would
compromise the right to a fair trial.' 22 Instead, the district court decided that it
would allow the government to administer involuntary medications to Weston and
Weston, 134 F. Supp. 2d 115 (D.D.C.), aff'd, 255 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
534 U.S. 1067 (2001). Although the Supreme Court can only decide the particular case or
controversy before it, the Court is nonetheless free to comment on decisions of lower courts
in other cases, and often does so, especially when - as here - disagreement exists among
the lower courts. For example, in another of the 2003 Term's attention-attracting cases,
Grutter v. Bollinger, the Court referred, in discussing the Court's Bakke opinion, to
"divergent opinions of the lower courts," and then cited several. 539 U.S. 306, 325 (2003).
117

"8 Weston, 134 F. Supp. 2d at 117.

United States v. Weston, 255 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1067 (2001).
Sell, 539 U.S. at 185.
121 See Weston, 134 F. Supp. 2d at 132-38.
122 Id. at 136-37 ("It is difficult for the Court to determine at this point whether unacceptable trial prejudice would result from the medication."); Sell, 282 F.3d at 572 ("[W]e believe
that the effects of the medication on Sell's competency and demeanor may properly be
considered once the medication is administered. The district court noted its willingness to
re-examine Sell's Sixth Amendment claim after the medication regimen has begun.").
"9

120
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would revisit the issue of trial rights once his response to the medications could be
12 3
observed.
The Supreme Court declined to review Weston,'24 which evidences only that
fewer than four Justices voted to grant certiorari.' 25 But given that the Sell Court
must have been aware of the extensive record in Weston, 126 and perhaps also the
extent to which other lower courts, 27 including those in Sell, 28 have relied on the
Weston cases, the absence of a single citation to Weston is curious, like the
29
proverbial elephant in the room that everyone sees but no one mentions. 1
A final curiosity is the absence of an opinion authored by Justice Kennedy.
Perhaps all the citations to his concurring opinion in Riggins' were sufficient to
persuade him to sign on to the majority's opinion. In previous involuntary medication cases, though, Justice Kennedy has been the voice of insight and reason,
authoring the Court's opinion in Harper,'3 ' and then recognizing - in a concurring
opinion not joined at the time by any other member of the Court 132 - that Riggins
was "not a case like Washington v. Harper."'33 During oral argument in Sell, Justice
Kennedy alone pressed the basic question of why the government thought it was
Weston, 134 F. Supp. 2d at 137 ("The Court will reassess, upon request, its
determination regarding the prejudice to Weston's fair trial rights resulting from medication
when testimony about the actual, not hypothetical, impact of the medication is available.").
For a discussion of some of the problems with this approach, see supra note 87.
124 United States v. Weston, 534 U.S. 1067 (2001) (denying certiorari).
125 See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 492 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Justice
Frankfurter wrote:
We have repeatedly indicated that a denial of certiorari means only
that, for one reason or another which is seldom disclosed, and not
infrequently for conflicting reasons which may have nothing to do with
the merits and certainly may have nothing to do with any view of the
merits taken by a majority of the Court, there were not four members
of the Court who thought the case should be heard.
Id
126 For example, the amicus brief submitted by the American Psychiatric Association, and
cited by the Court in its opinion, cited "passim" United States v. Weston, 255 F.3d 873 (D.C.
Cir. 2001). APA Brief, supra note 61, at ii.
127 See, e.g., United States v. Gomes, 289 F.3d 71, 79-82,
85-88 (2d Cir. 2002) (citing
Weston cases).
,28Sell, 282 F.3d at 565, 567 n.7 (citing Weston cases).
129 If the Court in Sell had stated that the government could not administer involuntary
medications to Sell because he was charged with nonviolent offenses, then Sell and Weston
could be distinguished. But the Court instead stated that crimes against property, like those
against people, can be serious. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
130 Sell, 539 U.S. at 179, 181, 185 (citing Justice Kennedy's Riggins concurrence).
..
' Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 213 (1990).
'32 The majority in Sell now seems to be in full accord with Justice Kennedy's
concurrence. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
133Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 140 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
123
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entitled "at all" to simultaneously prosecute a defendant and compel him to taKe
34
psychotropic medications.
CONCLUSION

It is doubtful that Sell will be the Court's last word on involuntary medications
and incompetent criminal defendants. Eventually, involuntary medications will
render a defendant competent to stand trial, 135 in a case in which the defendant
chooses to go to trial rather than to accept a plea bargain. Thus eventually, the
question before the Court will be whether the government really can, without
violating a whole host of constitutionally protected trial rights,136 place in front of
a jury a defendant to whom it is administering involuntary medications. Perhaps
then Justice Kennedy will write an opinion that cures all of Sell's other curiosities.

134 "I do not understand your basic authority to do this at all." PBS NewsHour, Update,
supra note 61 (quoting Justice Kennedy's question to a government lawyer).
' The government has, for example, administered involuntary medications to Weston
from early 2002 until at least November 19, 2003. Weston, 260 F. Supp. 2d at 148-49
(authorizing the government to continue administering involuntary medications until
November 19, 2003).
136 See supra notes 3-8 and accompanying text.

